

# Climate Justice and the PiTESAI Case: Towards a New Plan for Non-Proliferation and Abandonment of Fossil Fuels for a Just Transition in Italy

Daniele Vezzelli\*, Edoardo Crescini, Massimo De Marchi

*Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering  
University of Padova*

[daniele.vezzelli@phd.unipd.it](mailto:daniele.vezzelli@phd.unipd.it)


## **Climate Justice and the PiTESAI Case: Towards a New Plan for Non-Proliferation and Abandonment of Fossil Fuels for a Just Transition in Italy**

- Introduction to PiTESAI and the TAR Sentence
- Key Observations from the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Main Issues of the Plan
- Mapping Actors in the SEA Process
- Italy's International Policies for a Just Transition from Fossil Fuels
- Multi-Level Structure and Principles for a New Plan on Fossil Fuel Transition and Climate Justice

# PiTESAI Piano della Transizione Energetica Sostenibile delle Aree Idonee


*"... to identify a defined framework of reference for the areas where exploration ("prospezione e ricerca") and production ("coltivazione") of hydrocarbons are permitted on the national territory, to enhance environmental, social, and economic sustainability."*

*"...**environmental, social, and economic criteria** to determine whether a specific area is potentially suitable for exploration and subsequent exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits and/or compatible with the continuation of existing mining activities."*



# The TAR sentence

In February 2024, **the PiTESAI was annulled** by the Lazio Regional Administrative Court (TAR) (appeals submitted by companies and associations in the petroleum sector)



**Unextractable carbon (Welsby et al 2021)**  
Italian gas production could last 4.5 yrs  
(instead of 11), and oil production for 7.5 yrs  
(instead of 18) (De Marchi et al 2024)

Urgent need to develop a new plan to meet climate targets and achieve a just transition away from fossil fuels

## **Key observations on the just transition and climate policies from the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)**

### **1. Lack of a real exit plan from fossil fuels**

- The map of suitable areas with no clear roadmap to further reduce fossil fuel use, (possibility of new exploration permits without setting deadlines for closing existing concessions)

### **2. Limited involvement of local actors**

- No plans for a just transition in territories affected by extractivism.


### **3. Lack of integration with global policies**

- The plan did not consider international discussions to phase-out fossil fuels.
- No mentions to the concept of unburnable carbon or carbon budget, climate justice and a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty.

# TERRITORIAL SCALE: SEA OBSERVATIONS and ACTORS

- 79 out of 123 actors have explicitly called for moratoria on extraction activities within their territories and/or stop to any new oil&gas concession
- Clusters in Po River Delta Area and Basilicata

**The Basilicata region and the Po Delta require dedicated just transition plans that account for their specific transitional challenges**



# TOWARDS A NEW PLAN: INTEGRATING A GLOBAL VISION

Italian production represents only a fraction of the global total → **incorporating multi-scale reflections** into a new plan on Italy's role in international climate policies

## Oil: Production\*

Million tonnes																		Growth rate per annum		Share
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023	2013-23	2023
Denmark	15,2	14,0	12,9	12,2	10,9	10,0	8,7	8,1	7,7	6,9	6,7	5,6	5,0	3,5	3,2	3,2	2,9	-8,3%	-10,3%	0,1%
Italy	5,9	5,2	4,6	5,1	5,3	5,4	5,5	5,8	5,5	3,8	4,1	4,7	4,3	5,4	4,8	4,5	4,3	-4,5%	-2,4%	0,1%
Norway	119,6	115,9	109,6	99,5	94,3	87,7	83,5	85,4	88,0	90,7	89,4	83,9	80,3	92,7	94,3	89,2	94,7	6,2%	1,3%	2,1%
Romania	4,7	4,7	4,5	4,3	4,2	4,0	4,1	4,1	4,0	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,3	3,1	3,0	-4,7%	-3,2%	0,1%
United Kingdom	76,6	71,8	68,2	63,0	52,0	44,6	40,6	39,9	45,3	47,4	46,6	50,9	51,8	49,0	40,9	37,8	33,4	-11,4%	-1,9%	0,7%
Other Europe	19,6	18,6	17,6	16,9	16,7	16,7	17,1	17,0	16,5	15,6	15,0	15,2	15,0	14,4	14,3	13,6	13,7	0,6%	-2,2%	0,3%
<b>Total Europe</b>	<b>241,5</b>	<b>230,3</b>	<b>217,3</b>	<b>200,9</b>	<b>183,4</b>	<b>168,3</b>	<b>159,5</b>	<b>160,3</b>	<b>166,9</b>	<b>168,2</b>	<b>165,5</b>	<b>163,9</b>	<b>160,0</b>	<b>168,4</b>	<b>160,9</b>	<b>151,4</b>	<b>152,1</b>	<b>0,5%</b>	<b>-0,5%</b>	<b>3,4%</b>

**Energy  
Institute  
2024**

## Natural Gas: Production\*

Billion cubic metres																				Growth rate per annum		Share	
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023	2013-23	2023
Denmark	9,8	10,9	10,8	9,6	10,5	8,8	8,5	6,9	6,0	5,0	4,8	4,8	4,7	5,1	4,3	3,2	1,4	1,5	1,4	1,4	-3,3%	-11,9%	♦
Germany	17,1	16,5	16,3	15,0	13,6	12,7	11,1	10,5	9,5	8,6	8,1	7,5	6,9	6,4	5,5	5,3	4,5	4,5	4,3	3,8	-10,6%	-7,8%	0,1%
Italy	12,4	11,6	10,5	9,3	8,8	7,6	8,0	8,0	8,2	7,4	6,8	6,4	5,5	5,3	5,2	4,6	3,9	3,2	3,2	2,8	-9,9%	-9,1%	0,1%
Netherlands	71,6	65,3	64,5	62,0	70,9	65,5	75,3	69,5	68,4	72,4	60,4	45,9	44,3	37,9	32,5	27,7	20,1	18,0	15,0	9,9	-34,2%	-18,1%	0,2%
Norway	78,6	85,2	88,0	89,6	99,3	103,5	106,2	100,5	114,3	108,5	107,7	116,3	116,0	123,8	121,4	114,4	111,7	114,5	123,0	116,6	-5,2%	0,7%	2,9%
Poland	4,6	4,5	4,5	4,5	4,3	4,3	4,3	4,5	4,5	4,4	4,3	4,3	4,1	4,0	4,0	4,0	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,6	-5,5%	-2,1%	0,1%
Romania	12,1	11,3	11,1	10,7	10,5	10,4	10,0	10,1	10,1	10,0	10,2	10,2	9,1	10,0	10,0	9,6	8,6	8,6	8,8	8,9	1,4%	-1,2%	0,2%
Ukraine	19,4	19,7	20,0	20,0	20,3	20,3	19,4	19,5	19,4	20,2	20,2	18,8	19,0	19,4	19,7	19,4	19,1	18,7	17,5	17,7	0,9%	-1,3%	0,4%
United Kingdom	100,9	92,3	83,7	75,5	72,8	61,2	57,9	46,1	39,2	37,0	37,4	40,7	41,7	41,9	40,6	39,3	39,6	32,8	38,1	34,5	-9,6%	-0,7%	0,8%
Other Europe	10,8	10,2	10,8	10,0	9,4	9,3	9,3	9,2	8,4	7,2	6,3	6,1	8,7	9,0	8,4	7,4	6,3	5,4	5,1	5,1	0,2%	-3,2%	0,1%
<b>Total Europe</b>	<b>337,4</b>	<b>327,6</b>	<b>320,4</b>	<b>306,3</b>	<b>320,4</b>	<b>303,6</b>	<b>310,1</b>	<b>284,8</b>	<b>287,9</b>	<b>280,6</b>	<b>266,3</b>	<b>261,0</b>	<b>260,0</b>	<b>262,7</b>	<b>251,5</b>	<b>235,0</b>	<b>219,1</b>	<b>211,1</b>	<b>220,2</b>	<b>204,3</b>	<b>-7,2%</b>	<b>-3,1%</b>	<b>5,0%</b>

## TOWARDS A NEW PLAN: INTEGRATING A GLOBAL VISION

The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty:

- *Non-Proliferation*
- *Global Disarmament*
- *Peaceful Transition*



### CLIMATE POLICY

## No new fossil fuel projects: The norm we need

A social-moral norm against new fossil fuel projects has strong potential to contribute to achieving global climate goals

**Towards a New Plan  
for Non-Proliferation  
and Abandonment of  
Fossil Fuels for a Just  
Transition in Italy**



# TOWARDS A NEW PLAN: INTEGRATING DIFFERENT SUPPLY-SIDE POLICIES

Table 1 Taxonomy of supply-side policies and measures

Category	Supply-side policy	
Economic instruments—taxes and subsidies	Resource production taxes Resource export taxes Taxes on fossil fuel capital (income) Removal of fossil fuel producer subsidies	<b><i>Lazarus and van Asselt 2018</i></b>
Economic instruments—tradable allowances	Cap-and-trade for production rights Offsets for leaving assets in ground	
Regulatory approaches	Restricted leasing of state-owned lands and waters for coal, oil, and gas development Prohibiting development of specific resources, infrastructure (oil pipelines and terminals, coal ports, etc.), or use of certain technologies Limiting production or export (e.g., via moratoria or quota) Comprehensive emissions assessment in environmental impact review of new fossil fuel supply projects	Territorial and National Scale (PiTESAI)
Government provision of goods and services	Funding to compensate resource owners for leaving reserves undeveloped Divestment from companies involved in fossil fuel production Policies to restrict export credit agency or multilateral development finance for coal mining and other supply infrastructure	International Scale

**Table ES1.** Summary assessment of publicly available fossil fuel policies in 18 high-income signatories of the CETP and the European Investment Bank (EIB), as of July 2024

Country/institution	Development finance institutions (DFIs)	Export credit agencies (ECAs)
Belgium	✓	⚠
Canada	✓	✓
Denmark	✓	✓
EIB	✓	✓
Finland	✓	✓
France	✓	✓
Germany	⚠	⚠
Italy	✗	✗
Netherlands	✓	⚠
New Zealand	✓	✓
Portugal	✗	✗
Spain	✓	⚠
Sweden	✓	✓
Switzerland	✓	✗
United Kingdom	✓	✓
United States	✗	✗

**Legend:**

- ✓ All the assessment criteria are ranked as CETP-compatible or beyond CETP.
- ⚠ At least one assessment criterion is ranked as “below CETP.” One criterion maximum is ranked as “off-track.”
- ✗ At least two assessment criteria are ranked as “off-track.”

Source: Authors.

**The Clean Energy Transition Partnership (CETP)** (the “Glasgow Statement”) is the first international political commitment to end international public support for oil and gas, as well as coal, by the end of 2022 and to instead prioritize public support for clean energy.

“(…) Italy’s policy contains numerous wide-ranging loopholes that essentially allow **SACE**, Italy’s export credit agency, to continue its fossil finance virtually unhindered.”

**IISD 2024**

Institution	Coal	Upstream oil and gas	Midstream oil and gas	Downstream oil and gas	Timeline	Exemptions
<b>Cassa Depositi e Prestiti – Italy</b> (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, 2022)	↑ Full exclusion for coal	– Partial exclusion for upstream oil and gas (applying to unconventional extraction only)	✖ No exclusion for midstream oil and gas	– Exclusion for oil-fired electricity generation, with some exceptions  Large exemptions for gas-fired power generation	✓ Timeline aligned with CETP	– Gas-fired power generation is allowed if compatible with achieving the country's emissions-reduction goals and is promoted by counterparties that have a net-zero by 2050 plan.

Institution	Coal	Upstream oil and gas	Midstream oil and gas	Downstream oil and gas	Timeline	Exemptions
<b>Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero – Italy</b> (Export Finance for Future, 2023)	↑ Full exclusion for coal	– Full upstream oil and gas exclusion	– Full midstream oil and gas exclusion	– Exclusion for unabated power generation	✖ Timelines are incompatible with CETP. Gas exploration and production deadline is January 2026. Midstream oil deadline is January 2024 and January 2028 in the case of oil distribution. No deadlines defined for an end to gas financing, except in the case of unabated power generation (January 2023).	– Wide-ranging exceptions for oil and gas, including for national security, Paris alignment, energy efficiency, and decommissioning or reconversion

***“Italy has approved USD 1 billion in finance for four fossil fuel projects in 2023. Italy’s Export Credit Agency, SACE, provided an additional USD 4.3 billion in support for petrochemical projects that fall outside the scope of the CETP agreement (although refining is in scope).” (IISD 2024)***

# TOWARDS A NEW PLAN: INTEGRATING MULTIPLE SCALES

## LOCAL / TERRITORIAL SCALE

Specific just transition plans for sacrifice zones with clear timelines for the phase-out of hydrocarbon production in these areas and inclusive participation/procedural justice

## NATIONAL SCALE

A New PiTESAI aligned with the 1.5°C Target (“No New Projects”) (IEA 2021)

Defining a Clear Timeline for the Phase-Out of Hydrocarbon Extraction (as for coal)

## INTERNATIONAL SCALE

Commitment to end international public support for oil, gas (and coal) projects

# Future research and perspectives

- Importance of **territorial planning to phaseout fossil fuel production**, guided by studies on unburnable carbon and the principles of FF-NPT
- Need for a **new plan** for regulating the phase-out of fossil fuel production (New PiTESAI) with multiple scales of action + demand-side plan
- **Atlas of Fossil Fuel Projects** documenting the spatial dimension of fossil fuel projects financed by Italian Public Finance Institutions

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR  
ATTENTION**